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THE NEW CITADEL: A REASONABLY DESIGNED
PRODUCTS LIABILITY RESTATEMENT
INTRODUCTION
Laws, like products, can grow old and useless, and can be defec-
tively designed. This Note concerns a Restatement provision, revolu-
tionary when produced, that now stands so obsolete in the wake of
decades of change that some demand a new model. This Note dis-
cusses the newly designed law about product design.
The most frequently cited provision of the American Law Insti-
tute's Restatement (Second) of Torts is section 402A:1 "Special Liability of
Seller of Product for Physical Harm to User or Consumer."2 Before
the publication and adoption of section 402A in 1964, an injured
plaintiff had to choose between a negligence action and a contract
action based on warranty.3 Section 402A greatly expanded strict liabil-
ity for harmful products and initiated an explosion of litigation.4
Consequently, more causes of action alleging strict liability have been
brought in the area of products liability than in any other area of tort
law.5
In three decades of applying section 402A, state courts have estab-
lished varying interpretations of the provision 6 and a majority inter-
pretation has emerged.7 Responding to the judge-made law flowing
I HenryJ. Reske, Experts Tackle Torts Restatement, A.BA . J., Aug. 1992, at 18.
2 The text of § 402A reads:
(1) One who sells any product in a defective condition unreasonably dan-
gerous to the user or consumer or to his property is subject to liability for
physical harm thereby caused to the ultimate user or consumer, or to his
property, if
(a) the seller is engaged in the business of selling such a product, and (b)
it is expected to and does reach the user or consumer without substantial
change in the condition in which it is sold.
(2) The rule stated in Subsection (1) applies although
(a) the seller has exercised all possible care in the preparation and sale of
his product, and (b) the user or consumer has not bought the product
from or entered into any contractual relation with the seller.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (1965).
3 Charles E. Cantu, Reflections On Section 402A of the Restatement (Second) of Torts: A
Mirror Crack'd, 25 GONZ. L. REv. 205, 205 n.3 (1989-90).
4 Id. at 206.
5 Id. at 206-07. Section 402A was not really a descriptive restatement of existing law,
but a prescriptive statement of what the law should be. See infra note 26 and accompanying
text.
6 John L. Diamond, Eliminating the "Defect" in Design Strict Products Liability Theory, 34
HASTiNGS LJ. 529, 552 (1983) ("[D]ifferent courts ostensibly adhering to section 402A
endorse a variety of conflicting theoretical approaches.").
7 RESTATEMENT (THn) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS L ABiLr § 2 cmt. c (Tentative Draft
No. 1, 1994) [hereinafter RESTATEMENT (THmD) OF TORTS].
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from section 402A, Professors Henderson and Twerski proposed a re-
vision of section 402A in a law review article and subsequently were
appointed co-reporters of the products liability provisions of the Re-
statement (Third) of Torts.8 Since then, the co-reporters have published
a tentative draft of some of those provisions ("the Tentative Draft" or
"the new Restatement").9
The new Restatement departs from section 402A by, among other
things, providing separate standards of liability for manufacturing and
design defects. In accordance with the overwhelming majority of state
courts, it applies a strict liability standard to manufacturing defects
and a risk-utility standard to design defects.' 0 This Note treats the
new Restatement's standard for defective product design. According
to section 2(b) of the new Restatement:
A product is defective in design when the foreseeable risks of harm
posed by the product could have been reduced by the adoption of a
reasonable alternative design by the seller or a predecessor in the
commercial chain of distribution and the omission of the alterna-.
tive design renders the product not reasonably safe[.] I1
Comment c places the burden of proof on the plaintiff.12
After presenting background on section 402A, this Note discusses
the new Restatement standard for defective design and five states'
tests that conflict with it. These five states use three different tests as
alternatives to risk-utility: Alaska and California apply a two-pronged
test-risk-utility and consumer expectations-with the burden of
proof on the defendant as to risk-utility; Kansas and Nebraska have
straightforward consumer expectations tests; and Pennsylvania simply
holds the manufacturer as the guarantor of the product's safety.'3
This Note examines the new Restatement's risk-utility standard and
shows how one could construe the standard to be stricter than
an unadorned negligence standard. This Note then analyzes the
problems specific to each of the four standards and contends that risk-
utility is the most desirable approach. This Note limits its analysis to
8 James A. Henderson, Jr. & Aaron D. Twerski, A Proposed Revision of Section 402A of
the Restatement (Second) of Torts, 77 CORNELL L. REV. 1512, 1513 (1992).
9 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS, supra note 7 (covering the subjects of product
defectiveness, causation, and affirmative defenses).
10 Id. § 2 cmt. a. This risk-utility standard is to be distinguished from the broad-based
standard for product-category liability that considers the risk and utility of a product to
society and not just to the user. See O'Brien v. Muskin Corp., 463 A.2d 298 (N.J. 1983).
Also, under the Tentative Draft, the seller's liability, by virtue of its dependence on the
manufacturer's conduct, is somewhat strict. Therefore, when this Note refers to the Tenta-
tive Draft's risk-utility standard, it is with the manufacturer's liability in mind.
1 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS, supra note 7, § 2. This provision has been cited by
at least one court. See Smith v. Keller Ladder Co., 645 A.2d 1269, 1271 (N.J. Super. 1994).
12 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF ToRTs, supra note 7, § 2 cmt. c.
13 See infra part III.C.
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durable products and therefore omits discussion of prescription
drugs.14
I
SECTION 402A
A. Unrest About the Citadel: Social Justice & the Shift from
Contract to Tort
In the early 1960s, courts and commentators were concerned
with affording plaintiffs injured by products easier legal recourse. In a
1960 case arising from an automobile crash, Henningsen v. Bloomfield
Motors, Inc.,1 5 the New Jersey Supreme Court eliminated the privity
requirement under the doctrine of implied warranty of
merchantability. The Henningsen court justified allowing injured
plaintiffs to sue manufacturers under this new theory by describing a
manufacturer-plaintiff setting as one defined by gross inequality of
bargaining power and by standard form contracts used by all, or
nearly all, manufacturers in an industry. Consumers in an industrial
economy, therefore, were presented with a choice to take it or leave it,
which was little choice indeed.16 "[T]he demands of social justice,"
the court wrote, did not permit such a sharp bargain. 17
In a 1963 case, Greenman v. Yuba Power Products, Inc.,18 Justice
Traynor of the California Supreme Court also drew from a sense of
social justice to establish strict liability in tort as the standard for defec-
tive products. Characterizing consumers as "powerless,"19 Traynor re-
cited the maxim that "[t]he remedies of injured consumers ought not
to be made to depend upon the intricacies of the law of sales" 20 and
thereby allowed plaintiffs to seek effective remedy under tort law.
Parallelling the revolutionary courts, commentators also paved
the way toward strict products liability. In 1960, Professor William
Prosser's influential essay, The Assault Upon the Citade421 called for
courts to recognize the doctrine of strict liability in tort. Prosser was
the Reporter for the Restatement (Second) of Torts and he drafted section
402A.22 Comment c to that section reflects the sense of justice that
propelled products liability forward to the present day: "the seller, by
14 For the proposed standard for prescription drugs, see RESTATEMENT (T-mw) OF
TORTS, supra note 7, § 4.
15 161 A.2d 69 (NJ. 1960).
16 Id. at 83-86.
17 Id. at 83 (citing Mazetti v. Armour & Co., 135 P. 633, 635 (Wash. 1913)).
18 377 P.2d 897 (Cal. 1963).
19 Id. at 901.
20 Id. (citing Ketterer v. Armour & Co., 200 F. 322, 323 (S.D.N.Y. 1912)).
21 William L. Prosser, The Assault Upon the Citadel (Strict Liability to the Consumer), 69
YALE LJ. 1099 (1960).
22 See AMERICAN LAW INSTrrTUTE, 38TH ANNUAL MErING: PROCEEDINGS 87 (1961).
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marketing his product for use and consumption, has undertaken and
assumed a special responsibility toward any [consumer] who may be
injured by it."23
B. Section 402A. Wide Acceptance & Differing Interpretations
Adopted by the ALI in 1964, section 402A of the Restatement (Sec-
ond) of Torts has since been accepted as the nearly universal rule in
cases that involve injuries caused by defective products.2 4 In 1964
there was but one significant case, Greenman v. Yuba Power Products,
Inc., that had adopted strict liability.2 5 Thus, 402A did not restate ex-
isting law, but rather proposed a new solution to then existing
problems, sparking a significant change in plaintiffs' prospects for re-
covery.26 Today, there is widespread acceptance of the rhetoric and
principles behind section 402A, but much disagreement and confu-
sion over what standards to apply to different types of product de-
fects.27 Hence, the co-reporters of the new Restatement claim that
"the time is ripe for a true restatement of products liability law." 28
Section 402A imposes liability on the manufacturer of "any prod-
uct in a defective condition unreasonably dangerous" 29 but fails to dis-
tingnish between manufacturing and design defects. Therefore,
courts performed the task of categorizing product defects as manufac-
turing defects, design defects, or defects arising from failure to
warn.30 They were compelled to do so because the fundamental dif-
23 RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF TORTS § 402A cmt. c (1965). The idea ofjustice contin-
ues to pervade commentary on products liability. See, e.g., MARSHAL S. SHAPO, PRODUCrS
LIABILITY AND THE SEARCH FORJUsTMCE (1993).
[I]n products liability, a central component ofjustice is the vulnerable po-
sitions of consumers. A related element of justice lies in the moral inno-
cence of the claimant .... [T]he moral innocence of the plaintiff takes on
special significance because of itsjoinder with his or her vulnerability and
with the very fact of injury itself.
Id. at 137.
24 See Cantu, supra note 3, at 216.
25 1 Louis R. FRUMER & MELVIN I. FRIEDMAN, PRODUCTS LIABiLrY § 3.03[1], at 3-135
(1994) (stating that "[t]he first significant decision to apply the doctrine of strict tort liabil-
ity to a products liability case was decided in California [by the] California Supreme Court
... in Greenman v. Yuba Power Products, Inc. [377 P.2d 897 (Cal. 1963)]").
26 Henderson & Twerski, supra note 8, at 1526.
27 Id. at 1512, 1517.
28 Id. at 1529.
29 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (1965).
30 See Henderson & Twerski, supra note 8, at 1515; Raymond J. Kenney, Jr., Products
Liability in Massachusetts Enters the 1990'S, 75 MAss. L. REV. 70,70 (1990); Edward C. Martin,
Alabama's Extended Manufacturer's Liability Doctrine (AEMLD), 13 AM. J. TRIAL ADvoc. 983,
1004-05 (1990); John C. Mulgrew, Jr., Strict Tort Products Liability in Illinois-An Updated
Exposition, 76 ILL. BJ. 812, 816-18 (1987).
See, e.g., Shanks v. Upjohn Co., 835 P.2d 1189, 1194 (Alaska 1992); Caterpillar Tractor
Co. v. Beck, 593 P.2d 871, 881 (Alaska 1979); Gomulka v. Yavapai Machine & Auto Parts,
745 P.2d 986, 988-89 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1987); Barker v. Lull Eng'g Co., 573 P.2d 443 (Cal.
16571994]
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ferences between the defect types necessitated different legal
approaches. 3'
Courts have used a variety of standards to determine the exis-
tence of a product design defect; the foremost are risk-utility and con-
sumer expectations.3 2 Today, a majority of courts use some form of
the risk-utility approach,33 which derives from the negligence stan-
1978); Camacho v. Honda Motor Co., 741 P.2d 1240, 1247 (Colo. 1978); Zyferman v. Tay-
lor, 444 So. 2d 1088, 1091 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1984); Toner v. Lederle Lab., 732 P.2d 297,
316 (Idaho 1987) (Bakes, J., concurring); Hoffman v. E.W. Bliss, Co., 448 N.E.2d 277, 281
(Ind. 1983); Ulrich v. Kasco Abrasives Co., 532 S.W.2d 197, 200 (Ky. 1976); Halphen v.
Johns-Manvile Sales Corp., 484 So. 2d 110, 113 (La. 1986); Ziegler v. Kawasaki Heavy In-
dus., 539 A.2d 701, 703 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1988).
31 See infra note 38 and accompanying text. A product's manufacturer may incur lia-
bility either by producing a unit with some unintended flaw, a manufacturing defect, or by
producing a unit precisely as intended but which could reasonably have been done "bet-
ter." A material flaw that causes a glass bottle to explode is a clear example of a manufac-
turing defect; the use of materials that make a container particularly likely to explode
might illustrate a defect in design. Manufacturing defects generally present easy questions:
did the product conform to the specifications of its design or did it not? Design defects
pose a more subtle question: could the product have been made safer without an unrea-
sonable sacrifice in functionality or increase in expense?
32 See Henderson & Twerski, supra note 8, at 1520. For a fuller discussion of these and
other approaches to defective design, see infra parts II-III.
33 See 2 AMERICAN LAW OF PRODUCTS LIABIITY 3d § 28:11, at 213 (Timothy E. Travers
ed., 1987 & Supp 1994); Sheila L. Birnbaum, Unmasking the Test for Design Defect: From Negli-
gence [to Warranty] to Strict Liability to Negligence, 33 VAND. L. Rxv. 593, 605 (1980); Cantu,
supra note 3, at 220; Henderson & Twerski, supra note 8, at 1520; Christine M. Moylan, In
Pursuit of the Appropriate Standard of Liability for Defective Product Designs, 42 ME. L. REv. 453,
460 (1990); Ellen Wertheimer, Unknowable Dangers and The Death of Strict Products Liability:
The Empire Strikes Back, 60 CINN. L. REV. 1183, 1200 (1992).
See, e.g., Hull v. Eaton Corp., 825 F.2d 448 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (applying District of Co-
lumbia law); Dreisonstok v. Volkswagenwerk, A.G., 489 F.2d 1066 (4th Cir. 1974) (applying
Virginia law); Miller v. Todd, 551 N.E.2d 1139 (Ind. 1990); Philipe v. Browning Arms Co.,
375 So. 2d 151 (La. Ct. App. 1979); Ziegler v. Kawasaki Heavy Indus., 539 A.2d 701 (Md.
Ct. Spec. App. 1988); McCormack v. Hankscraft Co., 154 N.W.2d 488 (Minn. 1967); McCol-
lum v. Grove Mfg. Co., 293 S.E.2d 632 (N.C. Ct. App. 1982); Thibault v. Sears, Roebuck &
Co., 395 A.2d 843 (N.H. 1978); Voss v. Black & Decker Mfg. Co., 450 N.E.2d 204 (N.Y.
1983); Knitz v. Minster Mach. Co., 432 N.E.2d 814 (Ohio 1982); Wilson v. Piper Aircraft
Corp., 577 P.2d 1322 (Or. 1978); Phillips v. Kimwood Mach. Co., 525 P.2d 1033 (Or.
1974); Claytor v. G.M. Corp., 286 S.E.2d 129 (S.C. 1982); Mickle v. Blackmon, 166 S.E.2d
173 (S.C. 1969); Turner v. General Motors Corp., 584 S.W.2d 844 (Tex. 1979); Magic Chef,
Inc. v. Sibley, 546 S.W.2d 851 (Tex. Civ. App. 1977); Helicoid Gage Div. v. Howell, 511
S.W.2d 573 (Tex. Civ. App. 1974); Morningstar v. Black & Decker Mfg. Co., 253 S.E.2d 666
(W. Va. 1979); Fischer v. Cleveland Punch & Shear Works Co., 280 N.W.2d 280 (Wis.
1979).
But see Ronald F. Banks & Margaret O'Connor, Restating the Restatement (Second), Section
402(A)-Design Defec 72 OR. L. REv. 411, 413 (1993) ("Our review of the cases indicates
that only a small minority of courts actually adopt a risk-utility balancing test as a sole
method for determining a design defect.").
See generallyJohn W. Wade, On The Nature of Strict Tort Liability for Products, 44 Miss. L.J.
825, 844 (1973) (discussing whether the social usefulness of a product is so high that a
defendant should not be liable for the injuries).
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dard originated in United States v. Carroll Towing Co.34 Courts also have
found guidance in Wade's seven factors,35 which enumerate the rele-
vant considerations in a risk-utility analysis of product design.
The consumer expectations test bases liability on the disappoint-
ment of a consumer's expectations. Promoting consumer expecta-
tions as a test for defective design, Professor Marshall Shapo wrote,
'Judgments of liability for consumer product disappointment should
center initially and principally on the portrayal of the product which
is made, caused to be made or permitted by the seller."36 Most of the
courts that make recovery dependent on reasonable consumer expec-
tations also consider the availability of a reasonable, safer alternative
design.37
II
THE NEW RESTATEMENT: RISK UTILITY
The Tentative Draft's standard for defective product design is a
risk-utility test. Under this test, liability attaches if "the seller or a
predecessor in the distributive chain failed to adopt a reasonable al-
ternative design that would, at acceptable cost, have reduced the fore-
seeable risks of harm posed by the product and its omission rendered
it not reasonably safe." 38
A. The Risk-Utility Test
A majority ofjurisdictions have adopted a risk-utility approach to
defective design.3 9 Under risk-utility analysis, a product's design is de-
fective if its inherent danger outweighs its utility.40 According to Pros-
ser and Keeton, "[tihe theory underlying this approach is that
34 159 F.2d 169, 173 (2d Cir. 1947) ("[L]iability depends on whether [the burden] is
less than [the loss] multiplied by [the probability]."). See Moylan, supra note 33, at 462.
"The risk-utility test as employed in defective design cases has been referred to as 'merely a
detailed version of Judge Learned Hand's negligence calculus.'" Id. (quoting Prentis v.
Yale Mfg., 365 N.W.2d 176, 184 (Mich. 1984)). The factors considered in a traditional
negligence action are essentially the same as those under a risk utility analysis in strict
liability.
35 Wade, supra note 33, at 837-38. For text of the factors, see infra text accompanying
note 55. For a case using the Wade factors, see Caterpillar Tractor Co. v. Beck, 593 P.2d
871, 883 (Alaska 1979). See generally W. Kip Viscusi, Wading Through the Muddle of Risk-Utility
Analysis, 39 AM. U. L. Rxv. 573 (1990) (review and critique of Wade's seven factors).
36 Marshall S. Shapo, A Representational Theory of Consumer Protection: Doctrine, Function
and Legal LiabilityforProduct Disappointmen4 60 VA. L. Rnv. 1109, 1370 (1974). See alsoJAMRS
A. HENDERSON, JR. & AARON D. TwERsi, PRODUCrs LIABILrrv. PROBLEMS AND PROCESS 509
(2d ed. 1992) (listing cases that provide tests for defect wholly or partly in terms of con-
sumer expectations).
37 See Henderson & Twerski, supra note 8, at 1520, 1533.
38 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS, supra note 7, § 2 cmt. c.
39 See supra note 33 and accompanying text.
40 WiLLIAM L. PROSSOR & W. PAGE KEETON, THE LAW OF TORTS § 99, at 699 (5th ed.
1984).
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virtually all products have both risks and benefits and that there is no
way to go about evaluating design hazards intelligently without weigh-
ing danger against utility."4 1
The "feasible alternative design" concept entered products liabil-
ity through the risk-utility doctrine.42 Some courts and commentators
believe that the most effective way to demonstrate that the risks of a
design outweigh its benefits is to show that an alternative design exis-
ted which reduced the danger while retaining many or most of the
benefits.43 The feasible alternative design is clearly adopted in the
new Restatement's wording: if "the foreseeable risks of harm . . .
could have been reduced by the adoption of a reasonable alternative
design"44 then the product was defectively designed. Because risk-util-
ity is a cost-benefit analysis, the notion of reasonableness is implicit.45
B. What Led to the New Restatement;
The new Restatement distinguishes defective design from other
sources of product liability and adopts a risk-utility test.46 While a
manufacturing defect implicates only a limited number of noncon-
forming products, design defect litigation may condemn the defen-
dant's entire product line.47 This distinction has been lost on many
courts at once enraptured by notions of "strict products liability," con-
fused by the suggestion of fault-based concepts in products liability,
and confronted with the unworkability of determining on any "strict"
basis whether a design is defective.48 The new Restatement acknowl-
edges the vastly different character of manufacturing and design de-
fects and advocates a risk-utility test to determine whether a particular
design is defective.49
The standard for determining defective design differs from the
standard for determining defective manufacturing because in the for-
mer case there is no blueprint against which to measure a product's
shortcomings. In the case of a manufacturing defect, the plaintiff
41 Id.
42 See Wertheimer, supra note 33, at 1200.
43 Id. See, e.g., Habeckerv. Clark Equip. Co., 942 F.2d 210, 215 (3d Cir. 1991) (stating
that fact finder can only determine whether design was defective after hearing evidence of
what designs were feasible at time of manufacture and whether they were in fact safer).
"The state of the art defense, in which the defendant demonstrates that the product was as
safe as possible given the state of industry knowledge at the time of manufacture, also
entered through the [risk-utility] door." Wertheimer, supra note 33, at 1200.
44 See RESTATEMENT (THnD) OF ToRTS, supra note 7, § 2(b).
45 This Note later contends that the risk-utility approach is, functionally, the same as
negligence. See infra part IV.2.
46 REsTATEMENT (THRD) OF TORTS, supra note 7, § 2.
47 See Cantu, supra note 3, at 220-21.
48 See infra part IV.
49 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS, supra note 7, § 2.
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must prove only that a specific departure from the intended design of
a product proximately caused the injuries. To prove that a product's
design is defective, the plaintiff must meet an independent risk-utility
standard. This independent standard does not encompass society-
wide risks and utilities. The new Restatement does not suggest that
judges determine whether a category of products is desirable in the
abstract.50 A power drill, for example, is not defective merely because
its design poses some risk to society.51 Rather, the risks and utilities of
one particular means of drilling holes are evaluated in light of the
risks and utilities of other means of achieving the same ends.52 This
approach puts upon the plaintiff the burden of proving that the as-
pect of the design claimed to have proximately caused the injury
could have been made safer at a reasonable cost. This is the new Re-
statement's idea of a "reasonable alternative design," and it is the
linchpin of the proposed risk-utility approach to design defects. 53
Risk-utility offers a structured approach to the determination of
whether a product's design is defective. This structured approach is
exemplified by Wade's seven factors.54 These provide that in weigh-
ing risk and utility, a court should consider:
(1) The usefulness and desirability of the product-its utility
to the user and to the public as a whole.
(2) The safety aspects of the product-the likelihood that it
will cause injury, and the probable seriousness of the injury.
(3) The availability of a substitute product which would meet
the same need and not be as unsafe.
(4) The manufacturer's ability to eliminate the unsafe charac-
ter of the product without impairing its usefulness or making it too
expensive to maintain its utility.
(5) The user's ability to avoid danger by the exercise of care in
the use of the product.
(6) The user's anticipated awareness of the dangers inherent
in the product and their avoidability, because of general public
knowledge of the obvious condition of the product, or of the exis-
tence of suitable warnings or instructions.
50 Some courts, however, have gone in the direction of categorical products liability.
See, e.g., O'Brien v. Muskin Corp., 463 A.2d 298, 306 (NJ. 1983) (affirming reversal of a
summary judgment for defendants on the ground that "even if there are no alternative
methods of making bottoms for above-ground pools, the jury might have found that the
risks posed by the pool outweighed its utility" and thus contemplating condemning an
entire category of products as defective).
51 See Henderson & Twerski, supra note 8, at 1517.
52 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) oF TORTS, supra note 7, § 2(b) & cmt. a.
53 I&
54 Wade, supra note 33, at 837-38.
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(7) The feasibility, on the part of the manufacturer, of spread-
ing the loss by setting the price of the product or carrying liability
insurance.55
These factors provide some guidance to the risk-utility approach in
contrast to the open-ended consumer expectations standard.
The new Restatement, by imposing risk-utility balancing, allocates
risks between product sellers and users based on their abilities to bear
them efficiently.56 The manufacturer of a power drill, for example,
would find it difficult and extremely expensive to design the product
so that it posed no danger even when used carelessly. A manufac-
turer, therefore, should not be held liable for injuries suffered by a
careless user. Instead, the manufacturers should be held liable when
the design of the product endangers the reasonably careful user. The
co-reporters contend, "Imposing the unyielding liability rule estab-
lished for manufacturing defects on design risks would cause more
careful product users to subsidize less careful users, a result that would
be both inefficient and unfair. For many inherent product risks,
therefore, users are the best risk-minimizers."5 7
Beyond substantive considerations, the new Restatement also pro-
motes procedural efficiency in the sense that it dovetails with the ap-
proach already adopted in most jurisdictions. A majority of courts
already impose a risk-utility test on defective design, and most courts
that apply other tests temper their analyses with risk-utility balanc-
ing.58 Reflecting the majority's position on defective design, the new
Restatement promotes further consistency in an important area of
tort law. Asjudges and lawyers come to a more consistent understand-
ing of the field, products liability litigation becomes more efficient. In
light of the foregoing, Henderson and Twerski endorse the adoption
by a majority of courts of a risk-utility balancing standard for defective
design.59
III
STATE STANDARDS IN CONFLIar WrrH THE NEw
RESTATEMENT
Section 402A offered courts little guidance in formulating ap-
proaches to defective design. As discussed above, the majority of
states eventually adopted some form of the risk-utility test for defective
design. Five states, however, developed standards in conflict with the
new Restatement. This part examines the origins and elements of the
55 Id.
56 RESTATEMENT (THiRD) OF TORTS, supra note 7, § 2 cmt. c.
57 Henderson & Twerski, supra note 8, at 1517.
58 Id. at 1520, 1533.
59 Id. at 1517.
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three tests that these five states have adopted and compares them to
the risk-utility standard.
A. Straightforward Consumer Expectations
1. Kansas
The Supreme Court of Kansas adopted the consumer expecta-
tions test in Lester v. Magic Chef.60 The Lester court upheld a jury in-
struction providing that a product is unreasonably dangerous if it is
dangerous beyond the expectations of an ordinary consumer with
knowledge "common to the community as to [the product's] charac-
teristics."61 The court held that such an instruction accords with com-
ment i of section 402A.62
Since Lester, commentators have classified Kansas as a pure Re-
statement consumer expectationsjurisdiction. 63 In the ten years since
the decision the Supreme Court of Kansas consistently has applied the
consumer expectations test.64 As recently as 1988, the Tenth Circuit
reaffirmed Kansas' use of the consumer expectations approach. 65
2. Nebraska
In Rahmig v. Mosley Machinery Co.,6 6 the Supreme Court of Ne-
braska applied a "user-contemplation" test and overruled the then
leading case, Nerud v. Haybuster Manufacturing0 7 "insofar as feasibility
or reasonable alternative design must be proved by a plaintiff to pre-
vail on a cause of action for negligent design in a products liability
case." 68 The decision was motivated partly by a perceived conflict be-
tween the feasible alternative design (risk-utility) approach and Ne-
60 641 P.2d 353 (Kan. 1982). This test was adopted to define the phrase "unreasona-
bly dangerous" in RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A cmt. i (1965).
61 641 P.2d at 357.
62 Id.
63 See, e.g., Donna Fowler, Comment, Products Liability: Kansas Adopts the Consumer Ex-
pectation Test to Define "Unreasonably Dangerous" in Design Defect Cases, 22 WAsHBuN LJ. 397
(1983).
64 Barnes v. Vega Indus., 676 P.2d 761 (Kan. 1984); Betts v. General Motors Corp.,
689 P.2d 795 (Kan. 1984).
65 Wheeler v. John Deere Co., 862 F.2d 1404 (10th Cir. 1988).
66 412 N.W.2d 56 (Neb. 1987).
67 340 N.W.2d 369, 375 (Neb. 1983) ("In the proper application of a risk versus utility
analysis to a negligent design case, one of the factors which must be weighed is the feasibil-
ity of eliminating the risk and the existence of practicable alternative designs.").
The "user-contemplation" test is the same as that of consumer expectations. Both
arise from the language of section 402A: "The article sold must be dangerous to an extent
beyond that which would be contemplated by the ordinary consumer who purchases
it...." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A cmt. i (1965).
68 412 N.W.2d at 82.
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braska Evidence Rule 407,69 which makes evidence of post-accident
matters inadmissible.
In Rahmig, the plaintiff employee brought an action against the
manufacturer of a guillotine metal scrap shear for injuries he sus-
tained while cleaning the unity70 The injury occurred when the plain-
tiff climbed into a scrap metal discharge chute in order to clean it by
"kicking the iron out" with his boot.71 Unexpectedly, an upper blade
descended and amputated three of the plaintiff's fingers. 72
At the pre-trial hearing, the plaintiff, to show that there was some
practicable way in which the guillotine could have been made safer,
offered evidence of subsequent remedial measures.73 The trial court
admitted the evidence over the defendant's objection.74 After the
court found in favor of the plaintiff, the defendant appealed contend-
ing, inter alia, that the evidence was inadmissible under Nebraska Evi-
dence Rule 407.75
On appeal, the Nebraska Supreme Court rejected the defen-
dant's Rule 407 argument, noting that "the court in Nerud did not
immediately and directly confront the evidential problem involving
subsequent remedial measures." 76 The court ruled that the trial
court's admission of subsequent remedial measures was not erroneous
because Neruds requirement that a feasible alternative be proved ne-
cessitates the use of such evidence. 77 Although it could have affirmed
on this ground, the court went on to overrule the alternative design
requirement of Nerud.78
Other concerns led the Rahmig court to abandon the feasible al-
ternative design approach. According to the court, such a require-
ment restores "the exact burden to be avoided by the doctrine of strict
liability in tort for a product's design defect."79 In light of Nebraska's
"state of the art defense," the plaintiff would be in the anomalous po-
sition of presenting evidence pertaining to a defense before the de-
fendant could make such a defense.80 That is, the plaintiff would have
69 "When, after an event, measures are taken which, if taken previously, would have
made the event less likely to occur, evidence of the subsequent measures is not admissible
to prove negligence or culpable conduct in connection with the event." NEB. REV. STAT.
§ 27-407 (1989).
70 Rahmig, 412 N.W.2d at 60.
71 Id. at 62.
72 Id.
73 Id. at 63.
74 Id.
75 id. at 67.
76 Id. at 73.
77 Id.
78 Id. at 81.
79 Id.
80 Id.
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to present evidence of the "state of the art"-the state of technology
with regard to the product at the time of manufacture-to avoid non-
suit, and this very evidence would satisfy the burden of production for
a statutory defense. 81 The Rahmig court's adoption of the consumer
expectations test still stands in Nebraska. A more recent case, Adams
v. American Cyanamid,82 applied the consumer expectations test in a
suit alleging defective design.
B. The Barker Alternative Tests
1. California
The leading California case on defective design is Barker v. Lull
Engineering.83 In this case, the Supreme Court of California adopted
the following alternative approaches to defective design:
First, a product may be found defective in design if the plaintiff
establishes that the product failed to perform as safely as an ordi-
nary consumer would expect when used in an intended or reason-
ably foreseeable manner. Second, a product may alternatively be
found defective in design if the plaintiff demonstrates that the prod-
uct's design proximately caused his injury and the defendant fails to
establish, in light of the relevant factors, that, on balance, the bene-
fits of the challenged design outweigh the risk of danger inherent in
such design.84
The court rejected the trial court's instruction "that strict liability for a
defect in design of a product is based on a finding that the product
was unreasonably dangerous for its intended use."85
The Barker standard shifts the burden of proof regarding risk-util-
ity to the defendant. By contrast, the Tentative Draft requires the
plaintiff to establish that the product that caused the harm was defec-
tive.86 Justice Tobriner explained that the Barker allocation of burden
relieves "an injured plaintiff of many of the onerous evidentiary bur-
dens inherent in a negligence cause of action."87 He argued that be-
cause most of the evidence relevant to determining the
reasonableness of a product's design under the risk-utility test involves
"technical matters peculiarly within the knowledge of the manufac-
81 Id.
82 498 N.W.2d 577 (Neb. Ct. App. 1992) (involving damages to a crop of beans after a
herbicide manufactured by the defendant was applied to the plaintiff's fields).
83 573 P.2d 443 (Cal. 1978).
84 Id. at 455-56. The Barker court did not distinguish its risk-utility standard from
O'Brien-type risk utility. See supra note 10.
85 Id. at 446.
86 RESTATEMENT (THiRD) OF TORTS, supra note 7, § 2 cmt. c.
87 Barke, 573 P.2d at 455.
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turer .... the burden should appropriately shift to the defendant to
prove ... that the product is not defective."88
The other difference between the Barker test and the new Restate-
ment is that one of Barker's alternative tests is a consumer expectations
test. The California Supreme Court elaborated on the consumer ex-
pectations standard in Campbell v. General Motors Corp.8 9 The court
explained:
[Though the] quantum of proof necessary to establish a prima facie
case of design defect under the first prong of Barker cannot be re-
duced to an easy formula... if the product is one within the com-
mon experience of ordinary consumers, it is generally sufficient if
the plaintiff provides evidence concerning (1) his or her use of the
product; (2) the circumstances surrounding the injury; and (3) the
objective features of the product which are relevant to an evaluation
of its safety.90
This standard does not impose stringent requirements on a plaintiff
attempting to establish a prima facie case of failure to meet consumer
expectations standards.
In the year following Campbell, the California appellate courts in-
terpreted Campbell and Barker to permit application of the consumer
expectations test to virtually all products, even to those beyond the
experience of ordinary laypersons. 91 The Barker test is alive and well
in California and has been applied in recent cases.92
2. Alaska
The Supreme Court of Alaska adopted the Barker alternative tests
in Caterpillar Tractor Co. v. Beck.93 In Alaska, liability attaches if the
product (1) fails the consumer expectations or (2) fails the risk-utility
test.94 Once the plaintiff proves that the design caused the injury, the
burden of proving that the product met risk-utility norms shifts to the
defendant.95 The Supreme Court of Alaska decided "that the Barker
two-prong test provides the most comprehensive guidelines for in-
88 Id.
89 649 P.2d 224 (Cal. 1982).
90 Id. at 233.
91 Donald T. Ramsey, Consumer Expectation Test For Design Defect In California, 24 TORT
& INS. LJ. 650 (1984). See, e.g., Lunghi v. Clark Equipment Co., 200 Cal. Rptr. 387 (Ct.
App. 1989); Rosburg v. Minnesota Mining & Mfg. Co., 226 Cal. Rptr. 299 (Ct. App. 1986);
West v. Johnson &Johnson Products, Inc., 220 Cal. Rptr. 437 (Ct. App. 1985); Akers v.
Kelley Co., 219 Cal. Rptr. 513 (Ct. App. 1985).
92 See, e.g., Neal v. Montgomery Elevator Co., 9 Cal. Rptr. 2d 497 (Ct. App. 1992);
Dierks v. Mitsubishi Motors Corp., 256 Cal. Rptr. 230 (Ct. App. 1989); Fortman v. Hemco,
Inc., 259 Cal. Rptr. 311 (Ct. App. 1989).
93 593 P.2d 871 (Alaska 1979).
94 Id. at 884-85.
95 Id. at 885.
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structing juries, without compromising any of the goals of strict
liability."96
The alternative approaches proved favorable to the plaintiff in
Lamerv. McKee.97 In that case, the Supreme Court of Alaska reversed a
judgment on a jury verdict for the defendant on the grounds that
there was insufficient evidence to support the jury's finding that the
product met consumer expectations. 98 Alaskan courts have demon-
strated their continuing support of the Barker test in recent cases in-
volving design defects. 99
C. The Pennsylvania Two-Step
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court has created a unique and
widely criticized test for defective design. The leading case, Azzarello v.
Black Bros., Inc.,100 holds that "a manufacturer... is effectively the
guarantor of his product's safety." 1 1
In Azzarello, after a jury verdict for the defendant, the plaintiff
moved for a new trial, asserting that the "trial judge incorrectly in-
structed the jury that the appellee's burden of proof under Section
402A strict liability required a showing that the machine was 'unrea-
sonably dangerous.' 1102 The lower appellate court granted the mo-
tion 0 3 and Supreme Court of Pennsylvania ultimately affirmed. 10 4
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court agreed with the lower court
that "the use of the term 'unreasonably dangerous' in the charge was
misleading."' 0 5 Under Azzarello, a jury instruction must express the
following standard: "[T]he jury may find a defect where the product
left the supplier's control lacking any element necessary to make it
safe for its intended use or possessing any feature that renders it un-
safe for the intended use. 10 6
The threshold decision of whether a productwas "unreasonably
dangerous," however, is for the judge, not the jury.10 7 First, the court
is to apply a cost-benefit (risk-utility) analysis to the product design.
The outcome of the court's balance determines whether the case goes
to the jury. If it does, the jury applies the above-quoted test.
96 Id. at 884.
97 721 P.2d 611 (Alaska 1986).
98 Id.
99 See, e.g., Colt Indus. Operating Corp. Frank W. Murphy Mfg., Inc., 822 P.2d 925
(Alaska 1991); Keogh v. Grasle, 816 P.2d 1343 (Alaska 1991).,
100 391 A.2d 1020 (Pa. 1978).
101 Id. at 1026 (quoting Salvador v. Atlantic Boiler Co., 319 A.2d 903, 907 (Pa. 1974)).
102 Id. at 1022.
103 Id. at 1023.
104 Id. at 1027.
105 Id.
106 Id.
107 Id. at 1026.
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In Lewis v. Coffing Hoist Division, Duff-Norton Co.' 08 the Supreme
Court of Pennsylvania excluded "evidence of industry standards relat-
ing to the design" of the product'0 9 offered by the defense to show
that its design conformed to those standards and therefore was not
defective. The Supreme Court concluded that evidence of industry
standards and practice goes to the reasonableness of the defendant's
conduct in making its design choice, thereby improperly injecting
concepts of negligence law into a products liability inquiry."10
The more recent case Dauphin Deposit Bank & Trust Co. v. Toyota
Motor Corp."' expressly rejects the risk-utility approach to defective de-
sign and embraces Azzarello and Lewis as valid law.
IV
ANALYsIs & PROPOSAL
A. The New Restatement Concerns Arising from The
Elimination of Strict Liability for Defective Design
Although the new Restatement does not account for all the differ-
ences among states, it does reflect the majority approach to defective
product design. However, accordance with the majority rule does not
lay to rest all possible concerns about the new Restatement. One ma-
jor concern is that the Tentative Draft imposes what is functionally a
negligence standard on defective design. This section of the Note
treats the concerns arising from the adoption of this standard, con-
cluding that the risk-utility approach conforms with majority practice,
does not undermine the policies thatjustify strict liability in the manu-
facturing defect context, and, moreover, is the best alternative to truly
"strict" liability in the design context.
1. Does the New Restatement Undermine the Original Policies Behind
Strict Liability?
Strict liability for defective products arose from a concern that
injured plaintiffs should not have the undue burden of proving fault
on the part of the manufacturer."12 The justification is that a manu-
facturer's conduct is more remote and the proof of that conduct is
more inaccessible than the conduct of a tortfeasor in a normal negli-
108 528 A.2d 590 (Pa. 1987). For criticism of Lewis, see Joel I. Fishbein, Industy Custom
Evidence: Its Relevance In Design Defect Products Liability Cases-Lewis v. Coffing Hoist Divi-
sion, Duff-Norton Co., 61 TEMP. L. REv. 627 (1988).
109 Lewis, 528 A.2d at 594.
110 Id.
111 596 A.2d 845 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1991) (involving an action brought by one injured in a
motor vehicle accident against the manufacturer of an alcoholic beverage).
112 SeeWilliamJ. Powers, The Persistence of Fault in Products Liability, 61 TEx. L. REv. 777,
811 (1983).
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gence case.' 13 Indeed, a risk-utility approach runs contrary to this pol-
icy, putting the burden back on the plaintiff to prove a feasible
alternative design. But "[i]mproved discovery techniques and a more
sophisticated plaintiff's bar have . . . reduced some of the difficul-
ties."1" 4 Also, the plaintiff bears the burden of proving fault only
when he or she alleges defective design and thereby threatens an en-
tire line of products. Liability for manufacturing defects would con-
tinue to be "strict" in the traditional sense and would require no
showing of fault. 115
It is commonly asserted that strict liability for products will en-
courage manufacturers to make safer products.116 According to Pro-
fessor Powers, "Although a direct evaluation of a manufacturer's
conduct under negligence principles theoretically provides the
proper incentives, negligence law provides insufficient incentives in
practice if it is underenforced due to problems of proof."117 Professor
Powers argues that Barkers shift of the burden cures the plaintiff's
handicap and encourages manufacturers to invest in care.11 Yet, by
retaining fault as a basis of liability (through its risk-utility prong), it
offers some standard against which a product's design can be
measured."19
Another policy behind strict liability is that if a manufacturer gen-
erates a consumer's expectations about a product, the costs of the in-
juries caused by the disappointment of those expectations should be
borne by the manufacturer instead of the consumer. 120 This accords
with the consumer expectations test, in which the essential basis for
liability is the disappointment of consumer expectations, even if the
product could not be made safer at an acceptable cost. The risk-utility
test, on the other hand, takes such manufacturer-created consumer
expectations into account, but only as one factor among several. 121
2. Is the New Restatement Simply a Negligence Standard?
It is unlikely that courts accustomed to applying the "strict" label
will submit easily to an openly fault-based standard, though the
113 Id.
114 Id.
115 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS, supra note 7, § 2 cmt. b.
116 See Powers, supra note 112, at 811.
117 Id. at 812.
118 Id. at 811.
119 There are problems with this shifting of the burden, however, and they are dis-
cussed infra part MV.C.
120 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A cmt. c (1965).
121 Wade's seven factors account for the consumer's knowledge and expectations as to
the product. Wade, supra note 33, at 837-38. For text of the factors, see supra text accom-
panying note 55.
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change seems more semantic than real. 22 Indeed, many courts refer
to fault-based products liability standards as being "strict."1 23 The new
Restatement presents what is essentially a negligence standard.
The risk-utility approach that has evolved from section 402A is
grounded in negligence principles. Indeed, some courts and com-
mentators suggest that there is no distinction between negligence and
risk-utility in design defect cases. 124 The Supreme Court of Michigan
has referred to the risk-utility test as "merely a detailed version of
Judge Learned Hand's negligence calculus."125 The factors a court
should consider under the Restatement's balancing test for negli-
gence 126 are indeed similar to the factors used in design defect analy-
sis.127 Dean Wade pointed out in 1965 that the incorporation of risk-
utility into the defective design test transforms strict liability into a test
of negligence, as negligence itself is defined in terms of
reasonableness.1 28
Recognizing that a risk-utility standard for defective design is sim-
ilar to a negligence analysis, some courts rationalize that risk-utility is
122 Many courts speak of risk utility as strict liability. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS,
supra note 7, § 1 cmt. a. See Powers, supra note 112, at 784-94 (detailing how "the risk-
utility test has most seriously obscured the theoretical distinction between defectiveness
and negligence and, consequently, has hampered the effort to purge strict products liabil-
ity of fault").
123 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS, supra note 7, § 1 cmt. a.
124 See, e.g., Prentis v. Yale Mfg., 365 N.W.2d 176, 185-86 (Mich. 1984); Birnbaum, supra
note 33, at 649; Michael Hoenig, Product Designs and Strict Tort Liability, 8 Sw. L. REv. 109,
134 (1976).
125 Prentis, 365 N.W.2d at 184.
126 To determine utility
.
(a) the social value which the law attaches to the interest which is to be
advanced or protected by the conduct;
(b) the extent of the chance that this interest will be advanced or protected
by the particular course of conduct; [and]
(c) the extent of the chance that such interest can be adequately advanced
or protected by another and less dangerous course of conduct.
RESTATEMENT (SEcOND) OF TORTS § 292 (1965).
To determine risk:
(a) the social value which the law attaches to the interests which are
imperiled;
(b) the extent of the chance that the actor's conduct will cause an invasion
of any interest of the other or one of a class of which the other is a member;
(c) the extent of the harm likely to be caused to the interests imperiled;
[and]
(d) the number of persons whose interests are likely to be invaded if the
risk takes effect in harm.
Id. § 293.
127 See infra note 131 and accompanying text.
128 Moylan, supra note 33, at 456 (citingJohn W. Wade, Strict Tort Liability of Manufac-
turers, 19 Sw. LJ. 5, 15 (1965)). "The whole theory of negligence presupposes some uni-
form standard of behavior.... [N]egligence is a failure to do what the reasonable person
would do 'under the same or similar circumstances.'" PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 40,
§ 32, at 173, 175 (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 283 (1965)).
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strict liability by insisting that the plaintiff impugns the product rather
than the conduct of the manufacturer. 129 These courts contend that
by focusing on the product the fact finder will disregard the manufac-
turer's conduct and instead weigh the risks against the utility of the
product itself.130 Many commentators argue that such semantic
slights of hand do not change the substance of the standard em-
ployed. 13' Indeed, it seems that because the product is the "ultimate
manifestation" of conscious design decisions, to focus on the quality
of the product is to focus necessarily on the quality of the manufac-
turer's design choices.' 32 As Professor Powers contends, "[p]roduct
cost... is merely a reflection of the product's manufacturing process;
therefore, a court's consideration of product cost represents an evalu-
ation of the manufacturer's conduct."133 The significance of the
product-manufacturer distinction becomes clear when the "hindsight"
test 34 is applied to manufacturer design choices.
3. The Hindsight Test
In order to clarify the distinction between strict liability and negli-
gence, several jurisdictions have excised risk-utility analysis from their
strict liability standards. 35 In contrast, other jurisdictions have found
that a reasonableness, or risk-utility, standard differs from negligence
in that the former imputes knowledge of product risks from time of
trial back to the time of distribution-the "hindsight" test.136 Knowl-
edge of risk is distinct from knowledge of risk-avoidance measures.'3 7
In addition, the risks must flow from foreseeable uses of the product.
Therefore, in applying the hindsight test, courts cannot hold manu-
129 See Moylan, supra note 33, at 464. One court stated:
[T]here is a fundamental difference in the application of a risk/benefit
analysis in a negligent design case and the same analysis in a strict liability
design case. The difference is significant, for it shifts the central focus of
the inquiry from the conduct of the manufacturer (negligence) to the quality
of the product (strict liability). Negligence theory concerns itself with deter-
mining whether the conduct of the defendant was reasonable in view of the
foreseeable risk of injury; strict liability is concerned with whether the prod-
uct itself was unreasonably dangerous.
Dart v. Wiebe Mfg., Inc., 709 P.2d 876, 880 (Ariz. 1985) (en banc).
130 See Moylan, supra note 33, at 464.
131 See, e.g., id.; Powers, supra note 112, at 791-94.
132 See Moylan, supra note 33, at 465.
133 Powers, supra note 112, at 792.
134 See infra part IV.A.3.
135 See, e.g., Caterpillar Tractor Co. v. Beck, 593 P.2d 871, 882-84 (Alaska 1979); Barker
v. Lull Eng'g Co., 573 P.2d 443, 451 (Cal. 1978); Cronin v. J.B.E. Olson Corp., 501 P.2d
1153, 1161-62 (Cal. 1972); Azzarello v. Black Bros. Co., 391 A.2d 1020, 1024-27 (Pa. 1978).
136 See, e.g., Dart v. Wiebe Mfg., Inc., 709 P.2d 876 (Ariz. 1985); Bilotta v. Kelley Co.,
346 N.W.2d 616, 622 (Minn. 1984); Phillips v. Kimwood Mach. Co., 525 P.2d 1033 (Or.
1974).
137 That is, one may be aware of a product's risks but be unaware of the means by
which to avoid those risks.
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facturers liable for injuries resulting from unforeseeable uses of the
product.
The hindsight test, a version of the "reasonably prudent manufac-
turer test,"l38 imputes knowledge of the product's dangers (foresee-
able or not) as a matter of law from time of trial back to time of
distribution, thereby relieving the plaintiff of the burden of proving
the manufacturer's knowledge of a dangerous condition.13 9 The
plaintiff has to prove neither that the manufacturer was negligent in
failing to discover the danger, nor that the danger was discoverable.' 40
The hindsight test is closely related to some courts' position that risk-
utility departs from negligence by evaluating the product rather than
the manufacturer's conduct, thereby avoiding an inquiry as to the de-
fendant's fault.14'
The new Restatement imposes a foreseeability limitation as to risk
that should bar the use of a hindsight test.' 42 The adoption of a hind-
sight test, however, may be justified by the reduction of unnecessary
litigation over whether a product design's risks were foreseeable to its
manufacturer. 43 Also, courts and commentators have linked the
hindsight test to the strict products liability policy goals of encourag-
ing product safety,' 44 increasing cost spreading,145 and promoting
faimess.' 46
138 See Moylan, supra note 33, at 466. The other version of the "reasonably prudent
manufacturer" test is associated with Dean Wade, see supra note 33 and accompanying text,
and it imputes knowledge of risk at time of distribution to the manufacturer. Under the
reasonably prudent manufacturer test, the plaintiff must show that a reasonable manufac-
turer knowing of the product's danger would have changed the product before marketing
it. See Wertheimer, supra note 33, at 1193-94 (citing Sheila L. Birmbaum, Unmasking the
Test for Design-Defect: From Negligence [to Warranty] to Strict Liability to Negligence, 33 VAND. L.
RIv. 593, 618 n.4 (1980)).
139 Wertheimer, supra note 33, at 1193-94.
140 Id. at 1193.
141 See, e.g., Caterpillar Tractor, 593 P.2d at 889; Phipps v. General Motors Corp., 363
A.2d 955, 958-59 (Md. 1976); Phillips, 525 P.2d at 1036.
142 RESTATEMENT (TmD) OF TORTS, supra note 7, § 2 cmt. i.
143 John W. Wade, On the Effect in Product Liability of Knowledge Unavailable Prior to Mar-
keting, 58 N.Y.U. L. Rxv. 734, 754 (1983) ("It obviously is simpler to offer evidence of and to
reach a decision on the state of scientific knowledge at the present time than at some
particular time in the past.").
144 See id. at 754-55.
It has been argued that the hindsight standard is more likely to produce a
fully safe product. Awareness that later increases in knowledge will be taken
into consideration in assessing the safety of the product for liability pur-
poses supposedly will make the manufacturer more cautious in putting the
product on the market ....
Id.
145 See id. at 755 ("[L]osses arising from unknown and apparently unavoidable hazards
should be spread among all users of the product, just as are losses from expected injuries
or negligent conduct.").
146 See id. at 756 ("Some courts and commentators will look at the innocent victims of a
product defect and decide that ... the latter 'should bear the unforeseen costs of the
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4. Problems Specific to the Risk-Utility Approach
Courts and commentators point to three major reasons for re-
jecting the risk-utility test for defective design. 47 The first is the diffi-
culty of quantifying and comparing risks and benefits. 48 The second
is the difficulty of identifying the appropriate scope for comparing
risks and benefits.149 As Professor Powers points out, "[i]t is tempting
to compare the overall risks and benefits of a product, but the risk-
utility test is appropriately applied only to the specific feature that al-
legedly makes the product defective."'50 Third, courts do not rely
solely on the risk-utility approach to analyze defectiveness.' 5 ' Defec-
tive design cases are often affected by values other than efficiency. 152
Henderson and Twerski justify their adoption of the risk-utility
test in part by recognizing that many courts temper their consumer
expectations tests with risk-utility balancing.153 Support for the con-
sumer expectations approach arises from a perception that the eco-
nomic (risk-utility) test for liability may give inadequate attention to
consumer attitudes toward product-related risk.'54 Henderson and
Twerski, however, reject the straightforward consumer expectations
approach because it is so unstructured that it provides almost no gui-
dance to the jury and leaves manufacturers uncertain of the law's de-
mands.' 55 However, there are other tests that Henderson and Twerski
could have chosen. The following sections examine these.
B. Straightforward Consumer Expectations: Too Unstructured
The consumer expectations test has been criticized as highly sub-
jective, confusing, unpredictable, and unfair to manufacturers and de-
product.'" (quoting Beshada v. Johns-Manville Prods. Corp., 447 A.2d 539, 549 (N.J.
1982))).
Wade, however, argued that the hindsight test was not worth retaining for defective
design. Wade, supra note 33, at 754-55.
147 "It is important to keep in mind that these problems are common to both negli-
gence and defectiveness and therefore do not distinguish the two systems of liability." Pow-
ers, supra note 112, at 784-85.
148 Id. at 785 (noting that risks and benefits may be difficult to measure, since in-
tangibles such as pain and pleasure are not readily quantifiable).
149 Id at 786.
150 Id. ("For example, an automobile without seatbelts might be defective even though
the aggregate benefits of such an automobile outweigh its overall risks.").
151 Id. at 787 (noting that Learned Hand's formula for negligence has been criticized
as an oversimplification).
152 Id.
153 Henderson & Twerski, supra note 8, at 1533; Wertheimer, supra note 33, at 1200.
See, e.g., Aller v. Rogers Mach. Mfg. Co., 268 N.W.2d 830 (Iowa 1978); Baughn v. Honda
Motor Co., 727 P.2d 655 (Wash. 1986); Seattle-First National Bank v. Tabert, 542 P.2d 774
(Wash. 1975).
154 HENDERSON & TWERsK, supra note 36, at 504.
155 See Henderson & Twerski, supra note 8, at 1534.
1994] 1673
CORNELL LAW REVIEW
fendants. 156 The Model Uniform Product Liability Act rejected the
consumer expectations test altogether because, as the drafters stated,
"[t]he consumer expectations test takes subjectivity to its most ex-
treme end. Each trier of fact is likely to have a different understand-
ing of abstract consumer expectations. 1 57 The subjectivity of the
approach arises from its lack of structure. This section outlines how
this can result in drastic manipulation of the consumer expectations
test.
1. Warranty or Negligence?
The consumer expectations test has been described as emerging
from the warranty heritage of products liability.158 Indeed, protecting
justified expectations is a fundamental policy of contract law. "Courts
can adequately resolve cases involving specific consumer expectations
... under an express warranty theory, such as § 402B of the Restate-
ment (Second) of Torts or § 313 of the Uniform Commercial Code.' 59
In this sense, the only difference between consumer expectations and
warranty is the latter's requirement of privity between the plaintiff and
the defendant.
But the consumer expectations test can be formulated in such a
way as to make it functionally equivalent to a negligence test; it can be
argued that an ordinary consumer is not likely to expect more than
the exercise of reasonable care by the manufacturer.160 So, in apply-
ing a consumer expectations test, a court could decide that only rea-
sonable consumer expectations are protected. This transforms the
consumer expectations test into a risk-utility test. Some courts have
taken this approach.' 61 The consumer expectations test is so open-
textured that it is susceptible to a variety of formulations, ranging
from contract to tort. A consistent approach to defective design can
hardly be hoped for under this approach as different jurisdictions can
and do apply it differenty.162
156 See Ramsey, supra note 91, at 668.
157 Uniform Product Liability Act, 44 Fed. Reg. 62,714, 62,724 § 104(B) and analysis
(1979), reprinted in U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, UNIFORM PRODUCr LLzinTm ACT: A MODEL
FOR THE STATES 18 (1979).
158 See Birnbaum, supra note 33, at 614.
159 Powers, supra note 112, at 795-96.
160 See Moylan, supra note 33, at 459 (citing Roger C. Henderson, Strict Products Liability
and Design Defects in Arizona, 26 ARiz. L. REv. 261, 265 (1984); Gary T. Schwartz, Foreword:
Understanding Products Liability, 67 CAL. L. REv. 435, 479 (1979)).
161 See Henderson & Twerski, supra note 8, at 1520, 1533; see supra text accompanying
note 37.
162 Schwartz, supra note 160, at 479.
1674 [Vol. 79:1654
NOTE-THE NEW CITADEL
2. Sword or Shield?
The open-textured nature of the consumer expectations test ren-
ders it susceptible to highly conflicting formulations. A court could
apply the consumer expectations test as a "shield" that protects de-
fendants or as a "sword" that aids plaintiffs.
The consumer expectations test can be applied in a pro-plaintiff
fashion to a consumer who is unable to form clear and reasonable
expectations regarding danger in certain "highly technical, newly de-
veloped, or non-consumer oriented products, because the consumer
would simply have no idea how safe the product could be made."163
In this scenario, certainly, a consumer cannot be penalized for not
having unavailable knowledge about the product. The fear, however,
is that if the test is formulated to be very subjective, the careless user,
who has unreasonably high expectations for safety, may be subsidized
by those careful users whose expectations are reasonable.
The consumer expectations test also can be applied in a pro-de-
fendant fashion to a product that fails the risk-utility test. The prod-
uct would pass the consumer expectations test merely because the
consumer is unable to form reasonable expectations as to the prod-
uct.' 6 4 The consumer expectations test in this form replicates the
"patent danger" rule, 165 which holds that the manufacturer cannot be
held responsible for dangers that are obvious. The consumer expecta-
tions test is so unstructured that it can be formulated to favor the
plaintiff or the defendant. Consistency is impossible under such an
approach.
C. The Barker Burden Shift
The trouble with the Barker test does not arise from its dual char-
acter but from its placement of the burden of proof as to risk-utility on
163 Moylan, supra note 33, at 460. Professor Powers wrote:
The vague expectations of consumers probably oscillate between never ex-
pecting a product to injure them (on the theory that "it will never happen
to me") and actually expecting some products to be "lemons." The former
proves too much, since it would render defective every product that causes
injury. The latter proves too little, since it would exonerate products that
are clearly defective under current law.
Powers, supra note 112, at 796-97.
164 "For example, a punch press without guards to protect the hands of the operator
would not be defective under this test with respect to a hand injury incurred when the
operator inserted his or her hand between the press and the plate, because a reasonable
consumer would expect injury to result under such circumstances." Wertheimer, supra
note 33, at 1198. See, e.g., Hartman v. Miller Hydro Co., 499 F.2d 191, 192 (10th Cir. 1974)
(applying consumer expectation test to exposed drive shaft in bottle washing machine and
ruling that plaintiff "must be accredited with sufficient intelligence to realize that an ex-
posed revolving shaft is dangerous .... Thus, it cannot be said that a danger existed which
was beyond contemplation of an ordinary user. The danger was obvious.").
165 M. STUART MADDEN, PRODUcrS LABLrrY § 8.5 (2d ed. 1988).
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the defendant'16 6 Placing the burden of proof as to risk-utility on the
defendant thwarts efficiency, promotes inconsistency, and is too pro-
plaintiff to be a sensible approach to defective design. All a plaintiff
need do to get to the jury under the test is prove proximate cause.167
This approach would allow meritless claims to reach the jury. As Pro-
fessor Henderson argues, "precious judicial resources are wasted
when juries are relied on to decide cases that should, as a matter of
law, be recognized as without merit." 68 It is in this respect that the
Barker burden shift is inefficient.
By shifting the burden to the defendant as to risk-utility, the
Barker test makes directed verdicts for defendants less likely. 169 Al-
lowing so many cases to go to the jury prevents the courts from decid-
ing cases and developing a firm line of decisions against which to
measure new cases. 170 The ability of courts to direct verdicts for de-
fendants in clear cases ensures that some consistency will be attained
in a court's line of decisionmaking. 171 In this respect, the Barker bur-
den shift frustrates consistency.
Finally, the Barker burden shift is very pro-plaintiff. Professor
Henderson contends, "the difficulties of proving a case come not in
positing potentially helpful design alternatives, but in establishing
their cost effectiveness."1 7 2 The new Restatement affords adequate
protection for a plaintiff: To recover, the plaintiff must posit a techni-
cally feasible alternative design. The defendant's burden under
Barker, to prove that the benefits of the product's design outweighed
its inherent dangers, is a difficult task, especially with Barkeis applica-
tion of the hindsight test.
D. Problems with the Pennsylvania Two-Step
1. Azzarello's Division of Functions
According to Professor Henderson, "the inherent flaw in the [Az-
zarello] court's notion that the Restatement formulation can somehow
be useful for the guidance of 'the bench and bar' but not forjuries of
laypersons clearly surfaces in the confusing treatment afforded the di-
vision-of-function question." 173 If a plaintiff is not required to include
166 Barker v. Lull Eng'g Co., 573 P.2d 443, 446, 455, 458 (Cal. 1978). See also supra part
III.B.
167 James A. Henderson, Jr., Renewed Judicial Controversy Over Defective Product Design:
Toward the Preservation of an Emerging Consensus, 63 Minu. L. REv. 773, 787 (1979).
168 Id. at 786.
169 Barker, 573 P.2d at 443, 446, 455, 458. See also supra part III.B.
170 Henderson, supra note 167, at 785.
171 Id. at 786.
172 Id.
173 James A. Henderson,Jr., Products Liability: Controversial New Decision on Design Defects,
2 CoRP. L. REv. 246, 247 (1979).
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averments of unreasonableness in the complaint, a trial court cannot
usefully and fairly employ those concepts in testing the sufficiency of
the complaint1 74
Professor Twerski argues that the division of function keeps juries
from considering risk-utility cases in which the evidence is closely bal-
anced.175 According to Twerski, "[tihat the role of the jury is to be so
sharply limited on the issue of reasonableness is a matter of concern
since the jury has traditionally played an important role in the expan-
sion of the law of products liability."' 76 Other commentators have ex-
pressed confidence in the ability of the jury to arbitrate design defect
issues fairly.177 Leaving the determination of a product design's rea-
sonableness to the court is problematic because the formulation given
to the jury should be relativistic and should include a determination
based upon notions of reasonableness.
In addition to confusing the division of functions and eliminating
the jury's traditional role, Azzarello leaves the judge with an undefined
amount of power with regard to case outcomes. Considering that evi-
dence of industry standards is not afforded to the jury,178 this judicial
power in Pennsylvania is great. Furthermore, the question of what, as
a minimum, a plaintiff must aver is unanswered. Affording the judge
this much discretion is highly problematic.
2. Azzarello's Standard for Defective Design and the Lewis Rule
Under Azzarello, the manufacturer is the guarantor of the prod-
uct's safety, and a product is defective if it lacks any element necessary
to make it safe or possesses any feature that renders it unsafe for its
intended use.179 To insist, as the Pennsylvania Supreme Court seems
to have done, that a product design include every precaution, how-
ever costly, is an absurd and unworkable test.'80 One commentator
has surmised that such a charge may mislead the jury into speculation
about impractical, costly alternative designs, leaving manufacturers
vulnerable to unlimited liability.' 81 Finally, the limitation of liability
174 Id.
175 Aaron D. Twerski, From Risk-Utility to Consumer Expectations: Enhancing the Role of
Judicial Screening in Product Liability Litigation, 11 Hors-A, L. REV. 861, 926 (1983).
176 Id.
177 See Birnbaum, supra note 33, at 638.
178 See discussion of Lewis rule infra part III.
179 Azzarello v. Black Bros. Co., 391 A.2d 1020, 1026 (Pa. 1978).
180 See Henderson, supra note 173, at 248.
181 Robert F. Harchut, Recent Development, 24 ViLE. L. REv. 1035, 1050 n.103 (1978-
79).
It is suggested that an imaginative plaintiff's attorney, with the benefit of
hindsight, will nearly always be able to envisage something the manufacturer
might have done to make the product safe for its intended use. For exam-
ple, under the jury instruction espoused in Azzarello, it is conceivable that
the manufacturer of a knife could be held liable for not furnishing it with
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to intended uses ignores the possibility of foreseeable misuse cases.' 8 2
This standard for defective design can be very tough on manufactur-
ers, even with the cost-benefit weighing duty given to the court. Com-
mentators nationwide have criticized the approach as unworkable. 183
That Lewis keeps jurors from considering evidence of industry
standards relevant to the product's design emphasizes Pennsylvania's
minimization of the jury's role and its unworkably high standard for
product safety.'84 In the words of the former Pennsylvania Chief Jus-
tice Jones, "[t] he seller must provide with the product every element
necessary to make it safe for use." 185
There already has been criticism of Pennsylvania's approach to-
ward defective design within the high court of that commonwealth.18 6
Dissenting from the Lewis opinion, Judge Hutchinson emphatically
stated:
I am compelled, in the words of the popular song, to 'speak out
against the madness.' The instant madness is a creeping consensus
among us judges and lawyers that we are more capable of designing
products than engineers are ... [W]e must provide an impartial
forum when properly designed products cause injuries. 187
Noting the pro-plaintiff bias in the Pennsylvania courts, Hutchinson
went on to state that "there is respectable legal opinion that liability
for defective design cannot avoid the question of relative care, at least
on the question of legal cause."188
Hutchinson's reference is to Foley v. Clark Equipment Co.,' 8 9 a 1987
Pennsylvania Superior Court decision. The Foley court held that evi-
dence of plaintiffs' and other individuals' negligence is admissible
where it'is relevant to establish causation, even though negligence
some type of automatic retractable guard.... Thus, the question of how
liability will be avoided in such circumstances remains unanswered after
Azzarello. In addition, it is submitted that an instruction which states that
the product must be free from any condition that makes it unsafe for its
intended use may tempt juries to the extreme conclusion that if the plain-
tiff was injured, ipsofacto, the product must have been defective.
Id.
182 See Twerski, supra note 175, at 926.
183 See, e.g., Birnbaum, supra note 33, at 636-39; Harchut, supra note 181; Henderson,
supra note 173, at 248-49; Comment, Returning the "Balance" to Design Defect Litigation in
Pennsylvania: A Critique ofAzzarello v. Black Bros. Co., Inc., 89 DIcK. L. REv. 149 (1984).
184 Lewis v. Coffing Hoist Div., Duff-Norton Co., 528 A.2d 590, 594 (Pa. 1987).
185 Berkebile v. Brantley Helicopter Corp., 337 A.2d 893, 901 (Pa. 1975).
186 See Lewis, 528 A.2d at 596 (Hutchinson, J., dissenting).
187 Id. But see Ellen Wertheimer, Azzarello Agnistes: Bucking the Strict Products Liability
Tide, 66 TEMP. L. REv. 419, 420 (1993) ("Azzarello has ... allowed Pennsylvania to retain
strict products liability in its doctrinally pure form to a greater extent than many other
jurisdictions.").
188 Lewis, 528 A.2d at 596.
189 523 A.2d 379, 393 (Pa. 1987).
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principles generally are not to be injected into an action based upon a
theory of strict liability.190
E. Proposal
1. If It Ain't Broke, Why Fix It?
Although section 402A has given rise to different standards for
defective design in varying jurisdictions, it is not clear that the incon-
sistency is so problematic that a Restatement standard for defective
design is really necessary. Commentators have voiced concerns that
although the new Restatement may represent the best standard for
defective design, it may confuse courts accustomed to different stan-
dards and stunt the development of their law.191
While Professors Henderson and Twerski concede that courts will
undergo a phase of adaptation, 192 they predict that over time, courts
will grow to understand the virtues of the approach, and in this way,
the new Restatement will "advance the ball."'19 The new Restatement
will thereby promote predictability in future product design law.194
The co-reporters write:
[D]octrinal developments in products liability have placed such a
heavy gloss on the original text of and comments to section 402A as
to render them anachronistic and at odds with their currently dis-
cerned objectives. By changing the relevant language to conform to
current understandings-by restating the Restatement-we hope to
clarify much of the confusion that has arisen over the years. 195
The new Restatement reflects the majority's position as to defective
design, and provides guidance to the minority of jurisdictions with
standards other than the risk-utility test.
2. Courts Should Adopt the New Restatement
The benefits of the risk-utility approach, taken with its problems,
sufficiently outweigh the benefits of competing standards, making the
risk-utility approach the best test for defective design. The approach
best serves fairness and efficiency, and adopting and clarifying the ma-
jority position best serves consistency.
190 Id.
191 See, e.g., James A. Henderson, Jr. & Aaron D. Twerski, Will A New Restatement Help
Settle Troubled Waters?, 42 AM. U. L. REV. 1257, 1266-67 (1993) ("Although all may agree in
the abstract that clarity is a desideratum, there may be considerable sympathy and nostalgia
for the studied ambiguity of section 402A.").
192 Id.
193 Id.
194 Id
195 Henderson & Twerksi, supra note 8, at 1513.
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The main problems with the risk-utility approach arise not from
unworkability but from a tension with the underlying strict liability
rhetoric. The new Restatement openly adopts a fault-based standard
for defective design, an area some courts have become accustomed to
thinking of only in terms of "strict" products liability; these courts may
be reluctant to take up the proposed standard. However, the new Re-
statement's approach clarifies the law of defective design, an area
never really subject to strict liability, rightly confining notions of liabil-
ity without fault to the area of manufacturing defects. Risk-utility sim-
ply provides the most workable standard for defective design, which
explains why so may courts have adopted some version of it. As sug-
gested by this Note, a court could soften the plaintiff's burden, under
the risk-utility approach, by tempering it with the hindsight test. The
problems with the risk-utility approach are minimal when compared
to the unworkability of the Barker burden shift, the straightforward
consumer expectations test, and Pennsylvania's Azzarello standard.
A majority ofjurisdictions now impose a version of the risk-utility
test. It allows the determination of the most efficient and fair alloca-
tion of risk.196 While consumer expectations can be appropriately
considered in a risk-utility analysis, a straightforward consumer expec-
tations approach is too unstructured to provide guidance.
With the new Restatement, a state like Nebraska, where the
Rahmig court stressed the Restatement rule as strict liability,197 would be
free of the strict liability rhetoric because the new Restatement no
longer carries that label. An obstacle for Pennsylvania courts in shift-
ing to the risk-utility approach has been the dichotomy between strict
liability and negligence. This dichotomy was illustrated by the Lewis
court's desire to avoid allowing negligence concepts for jury consider-
ation.198 Indeed, comment a to section 402A provides, "The rule is
one of strict liability."199 The co-reporters of the new Restatement
state: "The provisions holding sellers liable for design.., defects re-
flect the influence of tort law's traditional risk-utility balancing."200
No longer do the words "strict liability" stand in Pennsylvania's, or any
other state's, way. All the courts need to do is recognize the new stan-
dard as the most authoritative and up-to-date voice on the matter and
terminate the allegiance to section 402A. It would not be the first
time Pennsylvania's high court has abandoned its own common law
for a Restatement provision.20 1
196 See supra note 7 and accompanying text.
197 Rahmig v. Mosley Mach. Co., 412 N.W.2d 56, 81 (Neb. 1987).
198 Lewis v. Coffing Hoist Div., Duff-Norton Co., 528 A.2d 590, 594 (Pa. 1987).
199 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A cmt. a (1965).
200 See Henderson & Twerski, supra note 8, at 1515.
201 See, e.g., HERBERT F. GOODRICH & PAUL A. WoLcN, THE STORY OF THE AMERiCAN
LAW INsTrrTUTE 1923-1961, at 15 (1961). "To the extent that past cases are in conflict with
[Vol. 79:16541680
NOTE-THE NEW CITADEL
CONCLUSION
The new Restatement for defective product design is a restate-
ment of the majority approach to defective design. It imposes a risk-
utility test to determine whether a design is defective. In purported
adherence to section 402A's standard of strict liability, some states
have refrained from adopting such an approach, fearing that to do so
would inappropriately invite consideration of negligence concepts.
The laws of the five states discussed in Part III represent this send-
ment and apply standards for defective design that are different from
that of the new Restatement.
Upon considering the benefits (and dangers) of these competing
standards for defective design, it is apparent that risk-utility, with the
burden of proof on the plaintiff, is the most sensible approach. It is a
structured standard against which to compare an allegedly defective
design and does not run the risk of condemning an entire product
line that could not reasonably be made safer. This Note does not take
a position on whether the hindsight test should be adopted with the
risk-utility test, but merely notes that it remains as a ground for com-
promise with the ardent adherent of strict liability.
The American judiciary's historic deference to the Restatement
supports the adoption of the new Restatement. Henderson and Twer-
ski have labored to erase "strict liability" from thinking on design de-
fect, thereby eliminating a conceptual hurdle. In the interests of
fairness, efficiency, and the ideal of uniformity aspired to by the Amer-
ican Law Institute, American courts should adopt the new Restate-
ment.
John H. Chunt
the view of section 339 of the Restatement of the Law of Torts, which we have adopted,
they are no longer authority." Id. (quoting Bartleson v. Glen Alden Coal Co., 64 A.2d 846,
851 (Pa. 1949)). For recent published support of Henderson and Twerski's revision, see
Peter N. Swisher, Products Liability Tort Reform Wy Virginia Should Adopt the Henderson-Twer-
ski Proposed Revision of Section 402A, Restatement (Second) of Torts, 27 U. RICH. L. REv. 857
(1993).
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